Claude cracked a 25 year cryptographic puzzle in half an hour, why didn't Bitcoin use this curve? 】 BlockBeats news, on October 17th, Anthropic recently revealed that its internal model Claude solved the NIST standard elliptic curve seed generation mystery that has plagued the cryptography community for about 25 years in less than half an hour. This discovery is also closely related to the underlying security design of cryptocurrencies. ECDSA is a widely used cryptographic standard for digital signatures, and related technologies support wallet signatures and identity verification for a large number of encrypted assets. Around 2000, some parameters of the NIST standard elliptic curve were provided by the National Security Agency (NSA) of the United States, but the seed generation process remained opaque for a long time, leading to speculation about potential backdoors. Claude discovered through reverse analysis that the relevant seeds were likely generated by the pseudo-random number generator lrand48 in the 1990s C language library, combined with Unix timestamps, rather than from complex, carefully designed secret algorithms. This provides a new explanation for the long-standing unresolved issue of parameter sources. Bitcoin, on the other hand, chose another route due to security concerns: Satoshi Nakamoto used the secp256k1 curve instead of the standard curve commonly used by NIST. This choice is often discussed in the context of a lack of transparency in the standard setting process, but it cannot be simply assumed that its sole motivation is to evade NSA backdoors. It should be emphasized that Claude cracked the generation method of some standard curve parameters, not ECDSA, and no new mathematical loopholes were found in the relevant curves. The restoration of parameter generation process helps to evaluate backdoor guessing, but it does not completely prove that all related implementations are risk-free. This test also demonstrates another side of AI in the encryption industry: it not only has the potential to change the landscape of cryptographic attacks and defenses, but can also be used to audit historical cryptographic designs, test security assumptions, and provide new security research tools for encryption infrastructure.